second order epistemic exclusion

📖 Definitions

"A second-order epistemic exclusion results from insufficient shared epistemic resources. To say that shared epistemic resources are insufficient is to point to limitations within those resources themselves." (Dotson 2014, 127)

"a second-order exclusion occurs when there are gaps in an epistemic system resulting from prior exclusions in the system’s development where these gaps consistently obscure what it is in the interests of particular knowers to know and have known. In such cases, a system will need to be more fully developed so as to facilitate epistemic agency more equitably." (Pohlhaus 2020, 235)

🔗 Relations

• type of: epistemic oppression
• similar to: hermeneutical injustice
• type of: epistemic exclusion

📚 References

• Dotson, Kristie. 2014. “Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression.” Social Epistemology 28 (2): 115–38. https: doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2013.782585.
• Pohlhaus Jr., Gaile. 2020. “Epistemic Agency Under Oppression.” Philosophical Papers 49 (2): 233–51. https: doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2020.1780149.

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